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In late 2018, the New York Times reported that the U.S. Cyber Command had targeted 
individual Russian hackers in order to deter them from engaging in conduct that could affect 
the organization and outcome of the U.S. mid-term elections.1 This unusual pre-emptive step 
suggests that states are looking for creative solutions to safeguard their national interests in 
cyberspace. But to what extent should their conduct be guided by considerations of 
international law? In this essay, I explore several key aspects of that central conundrum. I argue 
that (1) we should see cyberspace as an underregulated (but not ungoverned) domain; (2) a 
main reason for that state of affairs lies in a unique strategic dilemma innate to the cyber 
domain; and (3) non-state initiatives, including the eponymous “rule book on the shelf,”2 have 
a critical role to play in the development of the law in this area. 
 
The Underregulated Domain 
 
In 2019, it is no longer seriously argued that the reach of existing legal rules is or should 
be limited to the offline world.3 On the contrary, the most cyber-active nations have reached a 
consensus, expressed in two consecutive reports of a UN-mandated group of governmental 
experts, that international law is applicable to cyberspace.4 Although progress in the work of 
the group halted in mid-2017, both competing visions for its revival (proposed by 36 and 31 
countries, respectively) still fully endorse that baseline agreement.5 
 
Additionally, since the 1990s, states have occasionally floated the idea of a global cyber 
treaty.6 Most recently, China, Russia, and several Central Asian nations put forward two 
consecutive versions of a “Code of Conduct for Information Security.”7 However, a few crucial 
provisions in the Code were off-putting to their Western counterparts, including the duty to co-
operate in combating terrorism, separatism and extremism8—a wide formulation that could 
negatively impact human rights.9 As the United States noted in rejecting the instrument, it 
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“cannot support approaches proposed in the draft Code … that would only legitimize repressive 
state practices.”10 
 
To be sure, repeated failures of proposals with global ambitions underscore Efrony and 
Shany’s analysis that cyberspace is “exceptionally difficult to regulate.”11 Still, it is certainly 
imaginable that the cyber domain might one day be governed by a global binding agreement. 
After all, many other areas marked by non-national spaces and/or shared resources have proved 
susceptible to such regulation, including Antarctica,12 outer space,13 or the high seas.14 So how 
likely is it that there is going to be, say, a 2025 Cyberspace Treaty? 
 
Not very. This is due to a complex mix of reasons. The digital domain may still be 
awaiting its “constitutional moment,” a transformative event that would galvanize states into 
action and bring their representatives to the negotiating table.15 The technology probably keeps 
evolving too fast to allow for a meaningful consolidation of interests, a necessary precursor to 
any drafting exercise.16 Relatedly, accurate technical attribution of conduct in cyberspace 
remains a problem,17 which in turn undermines potential verification efforts—and why bother 
drafting a treaty the compliance with which cannot be properly verified?18 All these reasons 
weaken the prospects of a global cyber convention. However, the principal obstacle to state-
led law-making in the area of international cyber law arguably lies in an unprecedented 
dilemma posed by the unique nature of cyberspace. 
 
The Glass House Dilemma 
 
Asymmetries of cyberspace mean that the most powerful nations are, in a peculiar way, 
also the most vulnerable ones. In other spheres of human activity, states that wield the greatest 
power generally seek the greatest latitude for their actions and thus usually endorse permissive 
norms of behavior. Conversely, as a rule, weaker states support restrictive norms, seen as 
shields against their more powerful adversaries. Accordingly, major maritime powers have 
historically preferred norms that strengthened the freedom of the seas, whereas coastal states 
have insisted on projecting their sovereignty seawards.19  
 
The situation is much less straightforward in the cyber domain. Paradoxically, the more 
a society relies on its cyber capabilities, the more it becomes vulnerable to malicious cyber 
operations. On the offensive side, cyber powers may thus prefer permissive rules that would 
leave some leeway for stone-throwing. But on defense, those same states desperately need 
restrictive rules to protect the elaborate glass houses they are sitting in. Any development of 
rules of behavior in cyberspace thus needs to address not only the usual diversity of views held 
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by various states, but also the schizophrenic and sometimes mutually exclusive interests that 
an individual state may hold. 
 
The best illustration of this dilemma is in the legal qualification of low-level cyber 
attacks that have come to define our time. Consider, for instance, the statement issued by the 
British National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) in October 2018, which attributed a series of 
cyber attacks against various targets in the UK and elsewhere to the GRU, the Russian military 
intelligence service.20 It expressly noted that “[t]hese attacks have been conducted in flagrant 
violation of international law,” but, remarkably, the statement did not explain which specific 
international obligations had allegedly been breached.21 
 
Specifically, the NCSC noted that the GRU was “almost certainly responsible” for 
accessing e-mail accounts belonging to an unnamed UK-based TV station and for stealing their 
contents.22 Similarly, it considered the GRU “almost certainly responsible” for attempting to 
compromise computer systems belonging to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and 
the Defence and Science Technology Laboratory (DSTL).23 Such cyber operations can hardly 
be described as examples of friendly or responsible behavior. However, it is less certain that 
this conduct actually violated specific rules of international law. 
 
The most obvious argument that the UK could have relied on, as noted by Schmitt and 
Biller, is that interference with computer systems on UK territory without its consent violated 
its sovereignty.24 Tallinn Manual 2.0 sets out the framework for such an argument in its Rule 
4, which prescribes that “[a] State must not conduct cyber operations that violate the 
sovereignty of another State.”25 However, the Tallinn framework does not equate all 
interference with a violation. Rather, the experts considered that interference with cyber 
infrastructure (such as computer systems belonging to a private TV station) would, at a 
minimum, need to result in a loss of functionality of that infrastructure for the Rule to be 
violated.26 It is unlikely that such effect materialized through the cyber operations against the 
e-mail accounts of the affected British TV station if they were limited to the exfiltration of data. 
By contrast, regarding the FCO and DSTL attacks, the Tallinn commentary considers that 
“changing or deleting data such that it interferes with … the effective conduct of diplomacy 
[or] the performance of key national defence activities” could undermine a state’s exercise of 
one of its inherently governmental functions and thus violate its sovereignty.27 Depending on 
the actual or intended effect of those operations, the UK thus could have argued that Russia 
violated its rights based on the Tallinn interpretation of the law. 
 
However, earlier in 2018, the UK expressly repudiated the view that non-consensual 
interference in the computer networks of another state amounts to a violation of that state’s 
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sovereignty.28 Instead, in a speech by its Attorney General, the United Kingdom endorsed the 
position “that there is no such rule as a matter of current international law.”29 This obviously 
reduced the United Kingdom’s room for maneuver when it came to the legal qualification of 
the alleged Russian cyber operations.30 It also likely explains why the NCSC statement did not 
contain any legal reasoning in support of the accusations. 
 
This example illustrates the difficult dilemma faced by states that use their cyber 
capabilities in both offensive and defensive ways. In offence, it is in the United Kingdom’s 
interest to “interpret down” the applicable law and assert, as the Attorney General did, that 
low-level attacks do not violate any existing international legal rules. Conversely, in defense, 
the United Kingdom’s interest is to “interpret up” the law and insist, as the NCSC statement 
did, that such attacks do amount to violations. These interpretive dances are not only of 
symbolic value. When a state is the victim of a violation of international law, it is entitled to 
take action to compel the responsible state to stop, even if that action would otherwise be 
unlawful.31 Any such conduct in response is governed by the law of countermeasures, the 
applicability of which to cyberspace has been expressly endorsed by the United Kingdom.32 
 
The glass house dilemma is a key element of the “perfect storm” of challenges for the 
regulation of cyberspace described in the lead article.33 As the UK example shows, even those 
states that desire to move away from Efrony and Shany’s “policy of optionality”34 may find 
themselves torn between particular interpretations of international cyber law. By contrast, other 
domains are considerably more linear in terms of specific states’ interests. For instance, as the 
future Outer Space Treaty was being developed in the 1960s, the dividing lines lay between 
the capitalist West and the communist East, and between the space-faring nations and states 
without such capability.35 No such clear categories have yet emerged in the complex world of 
cyberspace.36 
 
The Role of the Non-State Actors 
 
Whatever the reason for states’ silence, it has generated a regulatory void, which has in 
turn prompted other actors to step in. Reflecting the current multi-stakeholder approach to 
cyberspace governance,37 these actors are quite diverse. In addition to the two Tallinn groups 
of experts scrutinized in the lead article, they have included think tanks (EastWest Institute or 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), representatives of industry (Microsoft or 
Siemens), and ad hoc groupings (like the Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace 
(“GCSC”)). 
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What connects these efforts is their shared aim to articulate norms of state conduct in 
cyberspace. For instance, Microsoft called on states to “exercise restraint in developing cyber 
weapons” and to “commit to nonproliferation activities” concerning such weapons.38 The 
Carnegie Endowment has pushed for a state commitment to refrain from conducting cyber 
operations that “undermine the integrity of data and algorithms of financial institutions.”39 And 
the GCSC has proposed a norm package on the stability of cyberspace, which includes norms 
urging states to disclose known vulnerabilities and to enact basic cyber hygiene.40 
 
These initiatives serve as “norm-making laboratories” for states.41 Ultimately, only 
states make international law; moreover, there are obvious question marks surrounding the 
legitimacy of endeavors initiated by private actors.42 Still, these initiatives do contribute in 
important ways to “the pluralisation of international norm-making.”43 The proliferation of 
cyber norms initiatives that are non-state driven but state-oriented gives states a unique 
opportunity to learn from, engage with, and react to those initiatives. It is these reactions that 
then become building blocks in the edifice of emerging rules of custom and interpretations of 
treaty rules—in other words, the law.  
 
Several cyber-active (and predominantly western) states have recognized the 
importance of these initiatives. For example, state representatives have described the Tallinn 
Manuals as “the first step in codifying cyber law,”44 as an aid in the creation of national 
positions on international cyber law,45 and as a “roadmap” for state action in cyberspace.46 The 
GCSC has received funding from states including Estonia, the Netherlands, and Singapore. 
And in November 2018, France launched the non-binding “Paris Call for Trust and Security in 
Cyberspace,” which was reportedly crafted jointly with Microsoft, and which more than 50 
countries and 200 other stakeholders subsequently signed.47 
 
However, what is more important than such pronouncements is the extent to which 
states meaningfully engage with the underlying initiatives.  Precedents suggest that states do 
take some non-state-led proposals seriously. For example, the 1994 San Remo Manual on 
International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea has greatly influenced the text of 
several national military manuals48 and, in a submission to the International Court of Justice, 
the United States expressly stated that it considered most of its provisions to reflect customary 
law.49 It is still early days for the cyber norms initiatives, but paradoxically even a repudiation 
of their interpretations (like the rejection of the Tallinn Manual’s sovereignty-as-rule approach 
by the United Kingdom) confirms their growing influence. By providing much-needed nuance 
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and granularity, non-state initiatives thus assist states in gradually resolving the glass house 
dilemma and help foster the international rule of law in the cyber domain. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The fact that a compilation of rules like the Tallinn Manual sits “on the shelves” of 
legal advisors around the world should not necessarily be seen as a weakness. To borrow an 
analogy from the culinary world, one doesn’t really have to keep the cookbooks on the kitchen 
stove for them to have an impact on one’s gastronomical creations. As long as the chef takes 
them “off the shelf” here and there and peruses them before beginning the next cooking 
adventure, they will probably have some influence on what the guests will consume that night. 
Like cookbooks, rulebooks (and other norms proposals) actually belong on the shelves—what 
matters is that they are easy to reach. 
